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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Russell Glenn Davis appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
marijuana with the intent to deliver entered pursuant to his conditional guilty plea. On
appeal, he argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court made the following factual findings in relation to this case:
On September 19, 2012, the Mountain Home Police Department
and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations were executing a search
warrant on a residence located at 750 S. 5th W., Apr. B202, in an
apartment complex known as Green's Place, in Mountain Home, Idaho.
This was the residence of Aaron Clifford, Cody Ferrier, and Blake Farris.
The warrant also included vehicles of the occupants. This was not the
Defendant's residence and the Defendant was not parked in a parking
stall designated for the residence.
Mountain Home Police Department Detective Christopher Jessup
was a detective assigned to special investigations of manufacturing,
distributing and sales of controlled substances during the time of the
search. He was trained in drug interdiction and had received over four
hundred hours of narcotics training. Detective Jessup was one of the
officers searching the residence pursuant to the search warrant. Detective
Griggs was another. While the residence was being searched, Cody
Ferrier, a resident of the apartment, arrived at the residence around 5:30
p.m. while the search was still being conducted. Detective Jessup located
a cell phone and one hundred dollars currency on Mr. Ferrier. Mr. Ferrier
was subsequently arrested and taken to jail. When Detective Jessup
received Mr. Ferrier's phone, he noticed an incoming text from a person
identified by the telephone contacts as Russell Davis. That text said
something like "give me a minute, I'm trying to get my mouth to stop
hurting." Detective Jessup recognized the name Russell Davis because
Jessup had previous contact in an earlier case the [sic] Jessup was
investigating. In the earlier case, Detective Jessup and Detective Griggs
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were involved in 2011 with the controlled buy of marijuana by Mr. Davis
from a confidential informant.
Detective Jessup reviewed texts on Mr. Ferrier's phone and wrote
them on a notepad, then included them in his police report. The relevant
text message string began at 3:14 p.m. when a message was received
allegedly from Mr. Davis that read, "Do you still want an O or anyone else
because putting in order now?" Based upon Jessup's training and
experience, he recognized the term "O" as slang for an ounce of
marijuana. Mr. Ferrier's immediately texted response was that he just
needed one and one, and asked to meet at Albertson's. A received text
allegedly from Mr. Davis two minutes later said something to the effect of,
"Let me know when you are there." Mr. Davis replied in the string that he
would be right there. Later in the string, Mr. Ferrier's phone texted that he
was grocery shopping with his mom. At 5:07 p.m., a text from Mr.
Ferrier's phone said, "Any word yet?," to which the alleged Mr. Davis
replied two minutes later, "yep, way over here, let you know when leaves."
Ferrier responded, "Right on."
At 5:27 p.m., Ferrier's phone received the message from the
alleged Davis phone, "I've got it, he's done so what you want to do?" A
message was sent from Ferrier's phone at 5:28 that said, "Cruise to the
apartment."
This was about the time that Ferrier's phone was seized by Jessup
and Jessup saw the message allegedly from Davis that said something
like "give me a minute, I'm trying to get my mouth to stop hurting."
Special Agent Jeff Thompson and Special Agent Dan King were
assisting in the service of the search warrant on the residence because
one of the residents of the house was an Air Force member. Special
Agents Thompson and King were wearing bulletproof vests and/or jackets
that identified them as "Federal Agents" on the front and back and were
both armed, although Agent Thompson could not remember if his sidearm
was visible. Special Agents Thompson and King were in the Green's
Place parking lot along with Special Agent Paul Shaiyah and Agent
Semens. All agents were dressed the same with the "Federal Agent"
identification showing.
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In the later afternoon, approximately at this same time, Agent
Thompson heard a vehicle pull into the parking lot behind the entrance to
the apartments. Agent Thompson identified the vehicle as a red SUV.
The driver got out and walked through the breezeway toward the entrance
of the apartment, came around a corner obscured by some bushes,
hesitated, and then kept walking toward the agents standing around the
entrance of the [sic] building B. Near the carport in State's Exhibit 2
bottom photograph, Agent Shaiyah made contact with the person, shaking
his hand, and introducing himself. Agent Shaiyah asked this person's
name and this person identified himself as Russell Davis.
Agent
Thompson had heard the name Russell Davis in conjunction with
marijuana sales during the investigation but had not seen Mr. Davis in
person or in a photograph so he did not recognize the person who arrived
at the apartment.
Agent Shaiyah asked Mr. Davis if he would have a seat on the curb
and Mr. Davis complied. This initial encounter took a couple of minutes.
Agent Thompson left, went up to the apartment being searched and told
Detective Jessup someone was in the parking lot. Detective Jessup
looked out a window of the apartment, [and] saw a red Pathfinder that
Jessup recognized as belonging to Russell Davis because of previous
contacts. Jessup and Thompson immediately went downstairs from the
apartment and into the parking lot, within minutes from Agent Shaiyah's
initial contact with Davis. Thompson thought within five minutes of the
initial contact. Jessup recognized and identified Russell Davis as the man
seated on the curb. Detective Jessup estimated this was within twenty
minutes of the last text sent from Ferrier's phone.
Officer Jessup asked Davis where he was going and Davis said
something to the effect that he was there to see Mike. Officer Jessup told
Mr. Davis that he had read text messages sent from a telephone. Officer
Jessup told Davis he believed those texts had come from the Defendant's
telephone and that the Defendant had come to the apartment to sell
narcotics. Officer Jessup noticed a bulge in the lower cargo pocket of the
Defendant's shorts. The officer then "poked" the bulge with his radio
antenna and then asked the Defendant what was in his pocket. The
Defendant did not answer. The Defendant was not confrontational, just
seemed annoyed. Agent King was also watching the pat down and
testified that he did not see any behaviors by Mr. Davis that Agent King
considered alarming or threatening. Agent King testified he felt that he
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was in the parking lot to keep anyone from going into the apartment to
contaminate the crime scene but did not feel his safety was threatened.
Other residents of other apartments were still on the premises but
remained in their apartments during this time.
Jessup told the Defendant to stand up for a pat down. The
Defendant placed his hands on his head as instructed. Jessup said he
placed his hand over the Defendant's hands to secure them, then used
the other hand to pat down the outside of the Defendant's clothing. Both
Detective Jessup and Agent Thomas [sic] testified they smelled raw
marijuana on Davis when they stepped behind Mr. Davis to conduct the
frisk.
Jessup testified that he believed the large bulge in the shorts to be
an ounce of marijuana and that he did not believe it to be a weapon.
Jessup testified he removed a bag of material he believed was marijuana
from the Defendant's pocket. He also removed a cell phone. Jessup
testified that he did not advise Mr. Davis that he was under arrest before
the pat down and Jessup did not believe Davis was under arrest during
the pat down.
(R., pp.50-53.)

The state charged Davis with possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver.
(R., pp.18-19.) Davis filed a motion to suppress the evidence, asserting a violation of

his constitutional rights. (R., pp.22-30.) The district court held a hearing on the motion
(10/21/2013 Tr., pp.1-86) and ultimately denied it (R., pp.50-57).
Davis entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of
his suppression motion. (R., pp.62-64.) Pursuant to his guilty plea, the district court
entered judgment against Davis and sentenced him to a unified term of five years with
one and a half years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.78-80.) Davis filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.82-84.)
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ISSUE

Davis states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court's denial of Mr. Davis's motion to suppress
was error because Mr. Davis was never in the immediate vicinity of the
premises to be searched and there was no nexus between Mr. Davis and
the activity giving rise to the search at the time of his detention[.]
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Davis failed to show error in the district court's denial of his suppression
motion?
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ARGUMENT
Davis Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Davis asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to

suppress on the theory that officers lacked sufficient basis to detain him in front of a
stairwell leading up to apartment B202, where officers were executing a search warrant,
in order to verify his identity and connection to the apartments. (Appellant's brief, pp.614.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found by the district court,
however, shows that there was sufficient probable cause to arrest Davis, let alone
detain him.

Davis has failed to show that the district court erred by denying his

suppression motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86,
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009).

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the

credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995).
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C.

The Arrest Of Davis, And Search Incident To That Arrest, Were Reasonable
Under The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Though this case arose from a warranted search of apartment
B202 and its residents, the parties stipulated that there was no warrant for either the
search of Davis's person or for his arrest. (R., p.50; see also 10/21/2013 Tr., p.1, L.24 p.2, L.17.) Warrantless searches and seizures are generally considered unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, "subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions."

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).
One such exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to lawful
arrest. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Warrantless arrests based
on probable cause are lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.
164, 171 (2008); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003); I.C. § 19-603.
Probable cause is "the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary
care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such
person is guilty."

State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996)

(citation omitted). In determining whether the State has met the standard of probable
cause, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371.
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The district court found the following facts: While executing a search warrant on
apartment B202 and its residents, Detective Jessup confiscated a cell phone which had
an incoming message from a person named "Russell Davis."

(R., p.51.)

Detective

Jessup knew Davis and knew of his connection to the drug trade from prior contacts.
(Id.) Reading through the text messages, and based on his training and experience,
Detective Jessup realized that Davis and the resident had set up a drug deal for Davis
to deliver an ounce of drugs to the apartment. (Id.) The final text exchange, in fact,
specifically invited Davis to "cruise to the apartment" to deliver the drugs.

(Id.)

At

roughly the same time as Detective Jessup read the text messages, a red SUV pulled
into the apartment complex's parking lot. (R., p.52.) Detective Jessup later recognized
the SUV as belonging to Davis.

(Id.)

A man exited the SUV, "walked through the

breezeway toward the entrance of the apartment, came around a corner obscured by
some bushes, hesitated, and then kept walking toward the agents standing around the
entrance of[] building B." (Id.) The officers detained the man near the entrance to the
apartment and identified him as Russell Davis.

(Id.)

Within five minutes, Detective

Jessup came out of the apartment, recognized Davis on sight, and noticed that he had a
bulge of something in his pocket. (Id.)
The totality of the circumstances known to police is measured by the collective,
not individual, knowledge of the police. State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 678, 168 P.3d
1019, 1025 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d
780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004)). Thus, the totality of the circumstances known to the police
was as follows:

In a series of text messages, Davis agreed to deliver drugs to a

resident of apartment B202. Davis sent a text message to let the resident of apartment
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B202 know that he would be coming to the apartment soon.

Shortly after this text

message was received, Davis arrived at the apartment complex in his SUV.

Davis

emerged from the vehicle and approached the apartment, carrying a bulge of something
in his pocket.

Officers affirmatively identified Davis.

police to have probable cause to arrest Davis.

That is sufficient evidence for

The search incident to that arrest,

though occurring immediately prior to the arrest, was also constitutional. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) ("Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the
heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person, we do not believe it particularly
important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa."). Therefore, there
is no basis to suppress the evidence.
Davis does not appear to dispute any of these facts on appeal.

Instead he

argues that, though Detective Jessup knew Davis and was familiar with Davis's
connection with the drug trade, Special Agent Shaiyah was unaware of those factors
and therefore lacked a sufficient basis to detain Davis to verify his identity and
connection to the apartments. (Appellant's brief, pp.2-3, 13.) But this just ignores the
doctrine of collective knowledge. See Baxter, 144 Idaho at 678, 168 P.3d at 1025.
Davis also argues that his detention was improper under the Fourth Amendment
because he was not in the immediate vicinity of the premises because he had not yet
accessed the stairs.

(Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) First, as shown above, the police

had probable cause to arrest Davis, let alone detain him for a few minutes to verify his
identity and his connection with the apartments. Second, as noted by the district court,
Davis was approaching the apartment from the adjacent parking lot. (R., p.54.) He was
stopped by the officers "very close to the stairwell" which led up to apartment B202.
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(Id.) He was sufficiently on the premises to be detained for a few minutes to verify his
identity and his connection with the apartments, consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
(Id.) See also State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 299-300, 47 P.3d 1266, 1270-71 (Ct.
App. 2002) (persons who arrive at the premises during a search may be detained for
the time necessary to determine identity and any connection to the premises).
Davis cautions that maintaining such a legal standard could result in "large-scale
detentions of anyone who tried to walk past a 50-story apartment building in a large city
while a search was occurring in one of the apartments." (Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.)
Davis's slippery-slope argument is inapplicable to cases that raise the issue of probable
cause. The totality of the circumstances standard for probable cause is based on the
circumstances.

A significant change to the facts presented in this case-a small

apartment complex with uncontrolled access to the apartments from stairwells adjoining
the sidewalk versus a 50-story apartment building in a large city-can always produce a
different outcome under the totality of the circumstances. And Davis has failed to show
any error in the district court's application of the correct legal standards to the totality of
the circumstances of this case.
Davis also relies on State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 155 P.3d 712 (Ct. App.
2007). (Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) But Reynolds does not aid Davis's argument. In
that case, while "recogniz[ing] that police are entitled to detain certain individuals in the
execution of a search warrant, even without independent reasonable suspicion that
those individuals are involved in criminal activity," the Court held that that exception did
not apply to Reynolds because police were conducting a probation search, not
executing a warrant.

kl at 914-16,

155 P.3d at 715-17. The Court also suggested that,
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to detain Reynolds during a probation search, police may need reasonable suspicion
that he was involved in criminal activity. JJ;L at 914, 155 P.3d at 717. Unlike Reynolds,
this case did involve the execution of a search warrant, and, as shown above, police
had probable cause to arrest Davis, let alone detain him.
Officers had sufficient probable cause to arrest and search Davis. The district
court correctly denied Davis's motion to suppress the evidence found on his person
during the search incident to his lawful arrest. The court's order should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Davis's motion to suppress evidence.

DATED this 12th day of December, 2014.

RU SSELt"j:fu5ENcER
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of December, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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